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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
TOM SNYDER, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
: Case No. 20010203-SC 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, 
a municipal corporation and : 
H. CRAIG HALL, City Attorney Priority No. 15 
for Murray City Corporation, 
Defendants/Appellees. : 
AN APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, the Hon. Stephen L. Henriod 
presiding. 
(Trial Court Case No. 99-090-7806 CV) 
Plaintiff/Appellant submits the following brief: 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(j) (1953 as amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1) Whether Murray City Corporation and H. Craig Hall 
violated appellant Tom Snyder's constitutional rights by denying 
Snyder the opportunity to give his prayer during the time set 
aside for prayers. 
2) Whether Snyder's prayer is religious in nature and 
afforded protection under the Utah Constitution. 
ISSUES RAISED AND CONSIDERED 
1) The issue of whether Murray City Corporation and H. 
Craig Hall violated appellant Tom Snyder's constitutional rights 
by denying him the opportunity to give his prayer during the time 
set aside for prayers was raised and considered at hearing on 
April 18, 2000. In addition, this issues was raised in 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting 
Memorandum, and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and 
supporting Memorandum (See R. 104, 211, 218, 227, 443, 435 & 
456) . 
2) The issue of whether Snyder's prayer is religious in 
nature and afforded protection under the Utah Constitution, was 
raised and considered at hearing on April 18, 2000. In addition, 
this issues was raised in Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and supporting Memorandum, and Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and supporting Memorandum (See R. 104, 211, 218, 227, 
443, 435 & 456). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1) The issues presented are questions of law. As such, 
they are reviewed under the "correctness" standard. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Certified Surety Group, Ltd. 
2 
v. UT Inc., 960 P.2d 904, 905-06 (Utah 1998)("In reviewing a 
trial court's grant of summary judgment, 'we do not defer to the 
trial court's conclusion of law but review them for 
correctness.'" (citation omitted)). 
2) The underlying facts are not in dispute and should be 
reviewed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs/appellants. 
Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982) (court to 
present facts and reasonable inferences from them in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment); Harnicher v. 
University of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67 (Utah 1998) (on summary 
judgment, the court must view the facts in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Murray City Corporation has a practice that all Murray City 
Council meetings start with a prayer. Plaintiff/appellant, Tom 
Snyder, wrote a letter asking to be allowed to present a prayer 
before the Murray City Council. Snyder enclosed a copy of the 
prayer that he would present. 
Appellee, H. Craig Hall, informed Snyder that his Opening 
Prayer was unacceptable and that Snyder could not offer his 
prayer in the opening ceremonies of a City Council meeting. 
Snyder filed a federal lawsuit. See Snyder v. Murray City 
Corp., 902 F. Supp. 1444 (D. Utah 1995), reh'g denied, 902 F. 
Supp. 1455 (D. Utah 1995). That matter was appealed to the Tenth 
3 
Circuit Court of Appeals, Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 124 F.3d 
1349 (10th Cir. 1997), and also heard en banc, Snyder v. Murray 
City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 1998), cert, denied, 
U.S. , 143 L.Ed.2d 499 (1999). Snyder's federal law claims 
were dismissed with prejudice. However, Snyder's state law 
claims were dismissed without prejudice, allowing Snyder to 
pursue these claims in state court. The instant lawsuit 
followed. 
The parties below moved this Court to grant summary 
judgment. Upon a hearing of the parties' motions, the court 
below denied Snyder's Motion for Summary Judgment and granted the 
City's Motion for Summary judgment. The court below dismissed 
Snyder's free speech claim as barred by the statute of 
limitations. The court below found that Mr. Snyder's prayer was 
not afforded protection under Society of Separationists v. 
Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993), the free exercise clause nor 
establishment clause of the Utah Constitution. This timely 
appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Murray City has a practice that all Murray City Council 
meetings start with a prayer. Complt., 1 13 (R. 5). 
4 
2. Murray City has encouraged people to offer invocations 
or inspirational messages, etc. at the beginning of its meetings. 
Hall1 Depo., 12:1-8 (R. 144). The City told Snyder 
. . . the [City] Council has established the policy 
that all council meetings will start with prayer. 
Hall Letter, June 1, 1994, copy attached to this Brief as 
Attachment "B" (R. 128). 
3. The purpose of prayer before the Council meetings is "to 
allow individuals an opportunity to express thoughts, leave 
blessings, etc." Hall Depo., 74:16-22 (R. 158); see also Hall 
Depo., 24:12-18 & 25:14-24 (R. 147). 
4. The administrative decisions (A) as to who may offer a 
prayer before City Council meeting; (B) as to the content of a 
prayer that may be offered; and, (C) if a proposed prayer offered 
is indeed a prayer and will be allowed to be presented are left 
to the discretion of the City Attorney2. Complt., 51 7, 8, 14, 
15 & 22 (R. 4, 6, & 8); Snyder Aff., M 4, 10 & 11 (R. 53 & 55). 
1
 The deposition of defendant Craig Hall was taken in an 
earlier case involving this same fact situation. Pertinent 
portions of his deposition taken 09/06/1994 have been made part 
of the record in this case (R. 142-175, 339-360). 
2
 Murray City and Hall (and his successor City Attorney) 
are occasionally referred to hereinafter, collectively, as "the 
City." 
5 
5. Hall had and his successor has the duty of enforcing the 
unwritten policy of Murray City as to the content and purpose of 
prayers. Hall Depo., 22:12-16, 70:5-11, 71:22-23, 72:23-25 (R. 
147, 157); Complt., 11 22 - 23 (R. 8). 
6. On June 9, 1994 Tom Snyder wrote a letter (R. 130) 
asking to be allowed to present a prayer before the City Council. 
Complt., 1 17 (R. 6); Snyder Aff., 1 13 (R. 56). A copy of the 
letter is attached to this Brief as Attachment "C". 
7. Snyder sought to exercise his religion and say a prayer, 
in the same manner, at the same time and in the same place that 
the City has allowed others to say prayers for many years. 
Complt., 1 26 (R. 8-9); Snyder Aff., 1 14 (R. 56). 
8. Snyder enclosed a copy of his proposed prayer (R. 131-
132). Complt., 1 18 (R. 7); Snyder Aff., 1 14 (R. 56). A copy 
of the prayer (hereinafter the "Opening Prayer") is attached to 
this Brief as Attachment "D". 
9. In a letter (R. 134) dated June 30, 1994, Hall informed 
Snyder that the Opening Prayer was "unacceptable" and that based 
upon the content, Snyder could not offer his prayer in the 
opening ceremonies of a City Council meeting. Complt., 11 20 & 
25 (R. 7 & 8); Snyder Aff., M 16 & 21 (R. 56 & 58). A copy of 
that rejection letter is attached to this Brief as Attachment 
"E". 
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10. Only after the City knew the contents of Snyder's 
proposed Opening Prayer, (Hall Depo., 18-20 (R. 146)), did the 
City reveal its supposed criteria for opening prayers. The 
criteria recited was tailor-made to apply to Snyder's proposed 
Opening Prayer. This criteria had never been applied to anyone 
else. Hall Depo., 12-13 (R. 144). 
NO WRITTEN GUIDELINES OR CRITERIA 
11. Unwritten guidelines of Murray City (Hall Depo., 13:23-
25 (R. 144)) as to offering of prayers were orally articulated by 
Hall only after Snyder sued the City for rejecting his prayer.3 
3
 The unwritten guidelines articulated after Snyder's 
request was rejected are: 
a) the prayer must be "an inspirational thought that 
encourages people to be civil;" Hall Depo., 13:10-12 (R. 144); 
the prayer must be civil in content; Hall Depo., 135:1-5 (R. 
172); the prayer cannot be offensive; Hall Depo., 144:20-22 (R. 
173); 
b) the prayer must "encourage people to have lofty 
thoughts;" Hall Depo., 13:13, 124:12-23 (R. 144, 169); 
c) the prayer must "encourage people to focus their 
attention on the items of the agenda for that night;" Hall Depo., 
13:14, 124:12-23 (R. 144, 169); 
d) the opening message may not express political views, 
attack, object to, or make fun of city policies or practices or 
mock, ridicule, or make light of city practices or policies; Hall 
Depo., 35:5-9, 35:10-13, 36:1-3, 100:14-25, 116:17-19, 124:12-23 
(R. 150, 163, 167, 169); 
e) the prayer must not personally attack government 
officials; Hall Depo., 108:18-25, 109:1-6, 111: 23-25 (R. 165, 
166) . 
f) the presenter and the prayer must be "sincere" and not 
"hypocritical"; Hall Depo., 97:17-24, 100:14-25, 124:12-23 (R. 
162, 163, 169); 
7 
12. None of the post-lawsuit criteria were ever reduced to 
writing prior to Snyderfs request. Hall Depo., 25:1-13, 119:9-
15, 151:23 thru 152:11 (R. 147, 168, 175). There have never been 
written rules, guidelines or restrictions as to presentation of 
prayers before Murray City Council meetings. Hall Depo., 9:21-
22, 14:6-10, (R. 143, 145); Complt., SI 21 (R. 7). 
13. The City has no appeal process to challenge or review a 
denial of a request to give a prayer. Complt., 1 27 (R. 9); 
Snyder Aff., 11 20 & 22 (R. 57 & 58). 
g) the prayer or opening message may not encourage or call 
for insurrection, physical harm to officials or people in 
attendance or incite physical violence; Hall Depo., 26:1-13, 
100:14-25 (R. 148, 163); 
h) political views are banned in the opening prayer; Hall 
Depo., 26:13-17 (R. 148); there is no written criteria as to what 
political views are to be banned; Hall Depo., 31:9-12 (R. 149); 
(Hall cannot define in advance what or which political views are 
banned from an opening prayer), Hall Depo., 26:13-17, 27:1-11, 
29:1-6, 31:1-8, 90:8-11, 90:21-25, 91:2-7 (R. 148, 149, 161) 
(according to Hall, Snyder's entire Opening Prayer constitutes a 
political statement); 
i) Hall cannot give "an all-inclusive definitive list" of 
what can or cannot be in an opening prayer; "We have to make 
decisions based on our experience and our knowledge and our 
training of what may or may not be appropriate in the 
invocation;" Hall Depo., 30:7-15, 32:4-9 (R. 149); 
j) prayers should be two to three minutes in length; Hall 
Depo., 58:1-5, 13-20 (R. 155); (but that is insignificant and has 
never been a problem, Hall Depo., 58:13-20 (R. 155)); and, 
k) the prayer must be consistent on its face; Hall Depo., 
71:14-19 (R. 157). 
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THE CITY'S SUBJECTIVE DETAILED REVIEW OF THE OPENING PRAYER 
14. The City claims that its does not censor prayers and 
has never told anybody what to say in an invocation. Hall Depo., 
117:5-10, 18-25 (R. 167). 
15. Hall believes that in most settings the Opening Prayer 
would be considered to be a prayer. Hall Depo., 125:12-13 (R. 
169). He understood that Snyder considered it to be a prayer. 
Hall Depo., 125:5-7 (R. 169). 
16. Hall believes that it is "okay" if someone offering a 
prayer before the City Council asks God for guidance for the City 
leaders. Hall Depo., 83:22-25 (R. 160). 
17. Hall is familiar with the Bible and Book of Mormon 
passages (Matthew 6:5-6; 3rd Nephi 13:5-6) which recite Jesus 
Christ's admonitions against offering prayers in public. Hall 
Depo., 48:12 thru 49:8 (R. 152). Hall understands that the 
Opening Prayer makes reference to that mandate. Hall Depo., 
107:14 thru p. 108:5 (R. 165). 
18. If Christ's admonitions against offering prayers in 
public were read before a Murray City Council meeting, Hall would 
not consider them to be "political views." Hall Depo., 49:23 
thru p. 50:17 (R. 152-153) . 
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SOME POLITICAL PRAYERS ALLOWED 
19. The City allows political views to be expressed during 
the Opening Ceremonies as long as Hall agrees or finds them 
appropriate. Hall Depo., 25-26 (R. 147-148). Hall reserves 
complete and unfettered discretion to determine which political 
views can be recited in opening prayers. Id. 
20. Hall testified that the opening prayers given "during 
the past 10, 12 years" have been "positive, upbeat, exhorting the 
City Council to do what they [sic] ought to do under their 
statutory responsibilities." Hall Depo., 25 (R. 147). 
21. When asked "[s]o it's not all political views then that 
are banned," Hall replied that "I don't know that until I see 
what political views are proposed. I would have to make a 
decision at that point." Hall Depo., 26 (R. 148). The City 
allows upbeat political statements concerning the City's 
lawmaking and other issues at Hall's sole discretion. Id. 
THE CITY SOUGHT DIVERSITY 
22. The City never used the term "generic" or any similar 
term in connection with its opening prayers. Hall Depo., 10, 
13-14, 55-58, 77-78, 108-09 & 117 (R. 144, 144-145, 155, 158-159, 
165 & 167). Prior to Snyder's litigation, the City never 
suggested that opening prayers were required to be "generic." 
Id. Instead, the City sought prayers offered by individuals of 
10 
diverse backgrounds and representing different and distinct 
portions of the community. Id. 
23. Letters sent by the City to those interested in giving 
invocations spoke only of dates and times. Hall Depo., 12-13, 
14-15 & 25 (R. 144, 145 & 147). None of the letters sent to 
interested participants contained any reference to standards or 
requirements to be applied to opening prayers. Id. No standards 
or requirements were ever communicated verbally to those 
interested in presenting prayers. Id. 
STATED REASONS FOR REJECTION OF OPENING PRAYER 
24. The Opening Prayer was rejected by Hall because of its 
content and for no other reason. Hall Depo., 60:1-3 (R. 155). 
25. The Opening Prayer was rejected, inter alia, because in 
Hall's opinion the text did not encourage lofty thoughts, to be 
civil and to clear the clutter of the day to get to the agenda. 
Hall Depo., 71:7-13 (R. 157). 
26. According to Hall, the phrase in the Opening Prayer, 
"We ask that you [God] will teach the people of Utah that 
government should not participate in religion," is a banned 
political statement. Hall Depo., 113:23 -114:3 (R. 166-165). 
27. Hall believes the Opening Prayer mocked the City 
Council for having invocations. Hall Depo., 91:20-24 (R. 161). 
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28. Hall considered the Opening Prayer as a whole and 
rejected it. Hall Depo., 116:17-19 (R. 167). 
REASONS NOT CONSIDERED IN REJECTION OF OPENING PRAYER 
29. That Snyder had not been "invited" but rather initiated 
the request to offer a prayer was not the reason for rejection of 
the Opening Prayer. Hall Depo., 59:8-13 (R. 155). 
30. Snyder's Opening Prayer was not rejected because it was 
too long. Hall Depo., 59:5-13 (R. 155). 
31. That the Opening Prayer may have contained alleged 
threats (God requested to smite or strike down officials4) was 
not a reason for the rejection of the Opening Prayer. Hall 
Depo., 149:11-14 (R. 174). 
32. Snyder's sincerity did not factor into the City's 
refusal to allow him to offer his Opening Prayer during the 
Opening Ceremonies. Hall Depo., 54-55 (R. 154).5 
4
 Snyder's use of the words smite and strike down in the 
Opening Prayer was as used in the Bible and the Book of Mormon, 
to get the attention of people and to remove wrong doers from 
positions of power. Snyder Aff., 1 31 (R. 159-160); Chatterjee 
Aff. 1 11 & 1 12 (R. 35-36). 
5
 After litigation was filed, Hall questions whether 
Snyder's beliefs expressed in the Opening Prayer were sincere. 
Hall Depo., 52:4-8, 92:9-14, 92:18-21 (R. 153, 161) (the whole 
prayer "reeks with insincerity"). Hall believed the Opening 
Prayer to be hypocritical or insincere and inconsistent. Hall 
Depo., 69:5-10 (R. 156). Hall claims the ability to determine 
whether a person is sincere in their religious beliefs. Hall 
Depo., 100:1-8 (R. 163). Hall claims the ability to read a 
12 
33. In reply to Snyder's request to give a prayer, Hall 
does not mention civility, loftiness or attention to the agenda. 
Hall Letters, June 1 and 30, 1994, (attached to this Brief, 
Attachments "B" & "E"). Until suit was filed and until Hall's 
deposition was taken, Snyder was not informed of any City policy 
other than: 
. . . the Council has established the policy that all 
council meetings will start with prayer. 
The purpose of the "prayer" is to allow 
individuals that opportunity to express thoughts, leave 
blessing, etc. It is not a time to express political 
views, attack city policies or practices or mock city 
practices or policies. 
Hall Letter, June 1, 1994 (R. 128). Copy attached to this Brief, 
Attachment "B". 
SNYDER'S RELIGIOUS, POLITICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS 
34. Snyder6 considers himself to be deeply religious, but 
is not exactly sure what he believes. He is searching for 
religious truth. Snyder Depo., 15:1-10, 22:1-10, 24:1-3, 56:23 
thru 57:1, 57:14-19 (R. 178, 180, 181, 188). Snyder leans toward 
document and determine whether its author is sincere. Hall 
Depo., 98:6-10 (R. 163) ("You know it when you see it."). 
6
 The deposition of plaintiff Tom Snyder was taken in an 
earlier case involving this same fact situation. Pertinent 
portions of his deposition taken 09/07/1994 were made part of the 
record in this case (R. 177-195, 362-402). 
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agnosticism.7 Snyder Depo., 14:17-21 (R. 178). He was born and 
raised in the LDS faith. Snyder Depo., 13:1-13 (R. 178). 
35. Snyder's personal and strongly held religious belief is 
that prayers are a private matter between an individual and his 
or her God. Jesus Christ specifically spoke against public 
prayers. Matthew 6:5-6 of the New Testament and 3rd Nephi 13:5-6 
of the Book of Mormon (see R. 136); Snyder Aff., 1 26 (R. 58-59). 
36. In Matthew and 3rd Nephi, Christ denounced the 
hypocrites that prayed out loud in a public show "that they may 
be seen of men" and exhorted follower to pray privately alone at 
home. Snyder Aff., 11 26 - 27 (R. 58-59). 
37. Snyder has a strong and abiding aversion to public 
praying. Snyder Depo., 30:1-10, 62:4-6, 85:8-12, 51:19 thru 
52:16, 53:1-5, 10 (R. 182, 189, 194, 187). Snyder's religious 
teachings are that a person should not pray publicly or on a 
street corner to be seen of men, but should pray to God in 
secret, in one's closet to God who hears such prayers. Matthew 
6:5-6, 3rd Nephi 13:5-6 (R. 136). 
7
 An agnostic is a person that does not know whether there 
is a God. An agnostic takes the position that there can be no 
proof as to whether a God exists. The questioning tone of some 
of the Opening Prayer appears to be that of an agnostic. 
Chatterjee Aff., 1 15 (R. 37). 
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38. Snyder's personal strongly held religious belief is 
that every person enjoys the right to practice their own religion 
according to the dictates of their own conscience and that all 
men and women should be allowed that privilege and be allowed to 
worship how, where, or what they may. Snyder Aff., 1 29 (R. 59). 
39. Although Supreme Court decisions allow prayers before 
City Council meetings, Snyder disagrees on a political and 
religious basis. Snyder believes that Murray City Council should 
cease such prayers. Snyder believes that those who continue to 
have such prayers act without wisdom and without an understanding 
of the religious nature of prayer. Snyder Aff., SI 28 (R. 59). 
DEVELOPMENT, CONTENT AND PURPOSE OF OPENING PRAYER 
40. The Opening Prayer addresses public prayers sponsored 
and encouraged by government entities. Complt., 1 19 (R. 7); 
Snyder Aff., I 15 (R. 56). The Opening Prayer represents a 
religious message (Snyder Depo., 88:14-21 (R. 195)) and 
communicates Snyder's thoughts. Snyder Depo., 74:25, 76:3-5, 
78:1-3 (R. 191, 192). 
41. The Opening Prayer represents Snyder's deeply held and 
sincere religious beliefs. Snyder's personal religious beliefs 
include philosophical and political ideas. Snyder can not 
separate his political views, his philosophical ideas and his 
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religious beliefs (Snyder Aff., SI 24 (R. 58)); Snyder Depo., 
15:11-17, 21:17-24 (R. 179, 180). 
42. Snyder developed and drafted the Opening Prayer after 
much thought and based upon consultation with others. Snyder 
Aff., 5 25 (R. 58). Snyder wanted to present this entreaty as a 
prayer and not solely as a political statement before the Murray 
City Council. Id. 
43. Snyder wanted the Murray City Council members to 
question whether they were misusing religion by having prayers 
before their meetings. Snyder Depo., 75:2-8 (R. 192). 
44. Snyder's prayer was, in part, a protest of the City's 
practice of prayer. Snyder Depo., 61:15-17, 67:2-5, 82:6-11, 
87:5-10 (R. 189, 190, 193, 195). The Opening Prayer was to make 
the City Council re-think their practice of prayer before their 
meetings. Snyder Depo., 76:3-5 (R. 192). 
45. Snyder hoped his prayer would spark debate and 
discussion. Snyder Depo., 58:3-8, 62:13-18 (R. 188, 189) (an 
education process; it would force the Council to think); 78:20-24 
(R. 192); 79:8-14 (R. 193) (to initiate thought); 87:5-10 (R. 
195) . 
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46. Philosophy Professor Deen Chatterjee8 examined the 
Opening Prayer. Chatterjee Aff., 1 4 (R. 33). He found the 
Opening Prayer, in format and content, to unquestionably be a 
prayer, an entreaty asking a deity to influence the day-to-day 
affairs of humans. The Opening Prayer has the classic construct 
and substance of a prayer. Chatterjee Aff., OT 5-6 (R. 33). 
47. Prayers often contain or display political views, along 
with philosophical ideas and religious beliefs. Philosophical, 
political and religious beliefs intertwine and often religious 
beliefs include or are indistinguishable from political ideas. 
Chatterjee Aff., 11 7-9 (R. 34-35). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Free Speech: 
By refusing to allow Tom Snyder to pray before the Murray 
City Council, the City violated the free speech provisions of the 
Utah Constitution. The lower court erred in dismissing Snyder's 
free speech claim based upon a statute of limitations. The lower 
court misapprehends Snyder's claim. The City's wrongdoing has 
continued since 1994 and continues today. The City still lacks 
8
 Deen Chatterjee is an associate professor of philosophy 
at the University of Utah. Chatterjee Aff., 1 2 (R. 33). 
Chatterjee's background and study of philosophy includes the 
study of religion. Chatterjee Aff., 1 3 (R. 33). 
17 
guidelines and criteria as to who can speak during the prayer 
portions of the Opening Ceremonies of the City Council meetings. 
Snyder's Free Speech claim is a facial challenge to the current 
unwritten policies and practices of the City. 
Snyder's free speech claim turns upon the type forum in 
question. By its actions, the City has designated the opening 
ceremony as a public forum open to members of the community for 
the purpose of conveying thoughts and ideas. As a result, the 
City must demonstrate a compelling state interest in order to 
control the content of messages conveyed during the opening 
exercise. The City has failed to demonstrate such a compelling 
interest. Rather, the City examined the content of Snyder's 
proposed prayer and rejected it based thereon. Opening the forum 
to speech, then disallowing Snyder the right to speak in that 
forum, constitutes a violation of the free speech protections of 
the Utah Constitution. 
Free Exercise: 
The City's refusal to permit Snyder's prayer violates his 
right to the free exercise of his religion. Snyder's free 
exercise claim turns upon the application of Society of 
Separationists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 935 (Utah 1993). The 
Utah Constitution demands perfect toleration of religious 
sentiment. Based on this strong language, this Court concluded 
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that the Utah Constitution mandates government neutrality toward 
religious practices. 
The lower court, however, determined incorrectly that 
Snyder's supplication was not a valid religious belief and denied 
Snyder's free exercise claim. The best indication of Snyder's 
religious beliefs are his personal statements. The scrutiny of 
the validity of particular beliefs is largely beyond judicial 
ken. Thus, the lower court erred in dismissing the sincerity of 
Snyder's belief. 
The court below should have accepted as true Snyder's 
sincerity. Snyder's supplication is a prayer and a religious 
exercise. The City did not remain neutral as to Snyder's 
religious exercise. Thus, the City violated Snyder's right to 
perfect religious toleration. 
Establishment Clause: 
Refusing to allow Snyder to pray before the Murray City 
Council, the City violated the establishment clause of the Utah 
Constitution. The lower court's determination of Snyder's 
establishment clause claim was linked to whether Snyder's prayer 
was indeed a "prayer". The lower court determined that the 
mandate of neutrality was meet because Snyder was afforded the 
opportunity to speak during a subsequent portion of the meeting 
(public comment period). Relegating Snyder to the public comment 
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period because the City finds Snyder's prayer offensive is as 
unconstitutional as entirely banning his prayer from the meeting. 
Government must maintain neutrality between those whose 
consciences are persuaded by religion and those whose consciences 
are not. Government must not prefer religion to non-religion, 
but neither should it be hostile to religion. Religious exercise 
must be unfettered and freedom of conscience is to be supreme. 
The City violated the Utah Constitution by their denial of 
Snyder's request. They provided a forum on public property and 
as part of a public ceremony. However, they denied Snyder use of 
it based on the contents of his prayer. The City's bias against 
Snyder's religious message violates the "neutrality principle" of 
the Utah Constitution. Those, like Snyder, who express non-
traditional religious tenets, are prohibited from participating 
in offerings before the City Council. 
The City's banning of Snyder's prayer impermissibly 
establishes religion in violation of the Utah Constitution. The 
City determines which religious beliefs are appropriate for 
public recitation. The City makes no attempt to be neutral. The 
City acknowledges no obligation to be neutral in determining who 
can pray before a City Council meeting. 
The City's criteria in considering a prayer means a minute 
examination of the contents. The City should not examine or sit 
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in judgment of a proposed prayer. Therefore, the City 
impermissibly "establishes" a religion in violation of the Utah 
Constitution as interpreted in Society of Separationists. 
Due Process: 
The City's summary denial of Snyder's request to present his 
prayer is a violation of Snyder's right to due process. The City 
created a protected interest when it created the Opening 
Ceremonies as a public forum for expression. Once the City 
created this forum, all must have equal access for the expression 
of their views. Government benefits, such as the use of the 
City's property during the Opening Ceremonies, must be provided 
on a nondiscriminatory basis and must be equally accessible to 
all. 
The essential requirements of due process are notice and an 
opportunity to respond. The City has failed to supply Snyder 
with even basic protection. The City did so without any criteria 
or hearing, thus it violated Snyder's due process rights. 
ARGUMENT 
I. FREE SPEECH CLAIM: BY REFUSING TO ALLOW SNYDER TO PRAY 
BEFORE THE MURRAY CITY COUNCIL, THE CITY VIOLATED ARTICLE I, 
§ 15 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The court below erred in dismissing Snyder's free speech 
claim made under Article I, § 15 of the Utah Constitution. See 
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Memorandum Decision, p. 1 (R. 474). The court dismissed Mr. 
Snyder's free speech claim based on a five (5) year9 statute of 
limitations. Id. (R. 474). 
The court below misapprehends Snyder's claim. While the 
City in a letter dated June 30, 1994, rejected Snyder's Opening 
Prayer, that was not the discreet end of the City's misconduct. 
The City's wrongdoing continues today and has continued since 
1994. As of the date of this Brief in 2001, the City still lacks 
guidelines and criteria as to who can speak during the prayer 
portions of the Opening Ceremonies of the City Council meetings. 
In 1994, in 1999 (when this action was filed) and even today, the 
City claims the right to reject a prayer based upon a subjective 
unwritten criteria. The City takes the position, even now, that 
Utah law does not afford Snyder access to the prayer portion of 
the City Council meetings. Therefore, Snyder's Free Speech claim 
is a facial challenge to the current unwritten policies and 
practices of the City. 
Furthermore, Snyder's Complaint clearly asks for prospective 
injunctive relief. Complaint, 1 1, 1 4, $ 54 (R. 2, 3, 15), & 1 
9
 Counsel for appellant finds no five (5) year statute of 
limitations under Utah law. The court was likely referring to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (3) (1953 as amended) which is Utah's 
"catch-all" provision allowing suits within four (4) years of a 
loss as to "relief not otherwise provided by law." 
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4 (relief) (R. 16). That equitable relief is based upon 
continuing misconduct of the City. The factual allegations of 
the Complaint recite the status of the City's prayer policy as of 
the date of the Complaint (August 1999), as well as the prior 
problems in 1994.10 
The Complaint recites: 
Murray City has no adopted written rules, regulations, 
policies or practices to govern what religious exercises or 
prayers may be offered by what entities, when or under what 
circumstances before a Murray City Council meeting. Murray 
City has no specifically adopted written guidelines or 
policies regarding the nature and/or content of prayers that 
may be offered before meetings of the Murray City Council. 
Complaint 1 21 (R. 7-8) (emphasis added); see also Complaint, 1 
13 (R. 5). In addition, Snyder alleges an ongoing violation as 
follows: 
An administrative decision as to who may say a prayer 
before the Murray City Council was and is left to the sole 
discretion of defendant Craig Hall or his successor. An 
administrative decision as to the content of religious 
exercise or prayer to be offered before a meeting of the 
Murray City Council is left to the sole discretion of 
defendant Hall or his successor. 
10
 All of the well plead allegations of the Complaint are 
deemed admitted for two (2) reasons: 
1) Defendants never filed an Answer denying the allegations, 
instead defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment; and, 
2) in considering a Summary Judgment Motion (in a trial 
court or on appeal) all facts are construed in favor of the non-
moving party. 
23 
Complaint 1 22 (R. 8) (emphasis added). 
Defendant Hall had and his successor has the 
administrative power on behalf of Murray City to determine 
if a proposed prayer is appropriate and will be allowed to 
be recited before a Murray City Council meeting. 
Complaint f 23 (R. 8) (emphasis added). And finally, 
Defendants have established no appeal process whereby a 
party can challenge or have reviewed a denial by the City or 
its agent of a request to give a prayer before a Murray City 
Council meeting. 
Complaint 1 24 (R. 8)(emphasis added). As a result, the court 
below erred in holding that Snyder's free speech claim is barred 
by the statute of limitations. 
Snyder's free speech claim turns upon the type of forum in 
question. The United States Supreme Court recognizes three types 
of fora: 1) traditional, or "quintessentially" public; 2) 
limited public; and 3) nonpublic. A traditional public forum is 
a forum which "by long tradition or by government fiat [has] been 
devoted to assembly and debate . . . ." Perry, Education Assn. 
v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). A 
limited public forum is "generally open to the public even if 
[the state] was not required to create the forum in the first 
place." Id. A nonpublic forum is a forum which "is not by 
tradition or designation a forum for public communication . . . 
." Id. 
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The City argued that the Opening Ceremony is a nonpublic 
forum and as such, they were justified in limiting the speech 
therein. The City is in error. While the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals did not review Snyder's free speech claims, the dissent 
nevertheless addressed this issue. See Snyder v. Murray, 159 
F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 1999). The dissent analyzed whether the 
reverence period was a designated public forum or nonpublic 
forum: 
"A designated public forum is property the government 
has opened for expressive activity, treating the property as 
if it were a traditional public forum." Summum [v. 
Callaahanl, 130 F.3d[, 906] at 914 [(10th Cir. 1997)]. Such 
a forum "may be created for a limited purpose such as use by 
certain groups . . . or for the discussion of certain 
subjects." Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 n.7. 
• * * 
"The government does not create a public forum by 
inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by 
intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public 
discourse." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, 
473 U.S. 788, 802, 87 L. Ed. 2d 567, 105 S. Ct. 3439 (1985). 
To determine whether the government has intentionally 
created a designated public forum, we look to "the policy 
and practice of the government," as well as "the nature of 
the property and its compatibility with expressive 
activity." Id. 
Since 1982, the City in this case has incorporated a 
reverence period as part of the opening ceremonies of its 
City Council meetings. Speakers during the reverence period 
are not public officials. Rather, the City has "made 
efforts to assure that a broad cross-section of the 
community would be represented" during the reverence period 
. . . . To effectuate this goal, Jewel Chandler, the 
secretary to the City Council, regularly "compiles lists of 
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various denominations and other groups'' who she thinks 
"would be potentially willing to come to the City Council 
meetings based on invitation to give a thought, prayer, 
whatever." 
• * • 
According to the City, participants in the reverence 
period "have included representatives from Zen Buddhists, 
Native Americans, a cross section of Judeo-Christian 
congregations, Quakers, and others." [citing the appellate 
appendix]. The invitations contain no restrictions on the 
messages that speakers can give. Further, at no time (save 
for this case) has the City ever asked a particular speaker 
about content of a message or conveyed any guidelines to a 
particular speaker. In fact, City Attorney Hall testified: 
I don't have a clue . . . what the Murray 
Baptist Church is going to say just as I did not 
have a clue as to what the Zen Buddhists were 
going to say. I don't know what the religious 
beliefs are. I don't know the particular tenants 
[sic] of their religious beliefs. I don't have 
a clue what they're going to say. 
[citing the appellate appendix]. Hall also testified: 
If a person wants to talk in the Buddhist 
faith about exhortation and blessings, that's 
fine. If the Navajos want to come in and do what 
they do. If the Catholics and Buddhists and 
Baptists and Seventh Day Adventists come in and 
don't mock city practices and policies and 
procedures during that period of time, we're not 
going to determine what their expression of 
thought or their statements are going to be. 
[citing the appellate appendix]. Finally, prior to Snyder's 
request to speak, the City had not developed any guidelines 
concerning the content of messages that could be given 
during the reverence period. 
Taken together, I believe these uncontroverted facts 
demonstrate an intent on the part of the City to designate 
the reverence period as a public forum open to members of 
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the community for the purpose of conveying religious and/or 
inspirational messages. In reaching this conclusion, I find 
significant (1) the City's goal of having a broad 
cross-section of the community speak during the reverence 
period, and (2) the lack of restrictions placed on reverence 
period speakers. To me, both of these factors indicate the 
City's intent to treat the reverence period as a setting 
open to all community members, regardless of religious 
viewpoint. 
Snyder, 153 F.3d at 1244-45 (Briscoe, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). The analysis at bar is no different. The Opening 
Ceremony is a limited (or designated) public forum. As a result 
. . . the City's ability to control the content of messages 
conveyed during the reverence period is much more limited 
than suggested . . . . "For the State to enforce a 
content-based exclusion" when dealing with access to any 
type of public forum, "it must show that its regulation is 
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it 
is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Perry, 460 U.S. at 
45. 
Snyder, 159 F.3d at 1246 (Briscoe, J., dissenting). The City has 
not done so. The sole interest that the City has asserted is its 
right to promote "high mindedness", "order" and "civility." 
These are simply not compelling interests to justify the 
restriction of free speech under the Utah Constitution.11 
The City cannot have it both ways: it cannot purport to 
open the reverence period to a broad cross-section of the 
community without restrictions, while at the same time 
11
 The First Amendment and Utah's constitutional free 
speech provision would be meaningless if protected speech was 
only that which is "high minded," "civil" and "orderly." See 
Memorandum Decision, at 8. 
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limiting a particular speaker's access to the reverence 
period because of its distaste for the speaker's proposed 
message. Thus, I believe it must either allow Snyder the 
opportunity to give his tendered prayer or cease its 
currently-formatted reverence period altogether. 
Snyder, 159 F.3d at 1246-47 (Briscoe, J., dissenting). The City 
created a public forum where people are allowed to express their 
ideas, religious and non-religious. Nevertheless, the City 
determined that Snyder could not give his prayer based upon the 
content of the prayer. The City examined the content of the 
prayer Snyder proposed to offer and rejected it. Opening the 
forum to religious speech, then disallowing Snyder the right to 
speak in that forum, constitutes a violation of the free speech 
protections of the Utah Constitution.12 
As a result, this Court should reverse the dismissal of 
Snyder's free speech claims. 
II. FREE EXERCISE CLAIM: DEFENDANTS' REFUSAL TO PERMIT SNYDER'S 
PRAYER VIOLATES SNYDER'S RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE I, § 4, UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
Snyder's free exercise claim turns upon the correct 
application of Society of Seoarationists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 
12
 Article I, § 15 of the Utah Constitution reads in 
pertinent part: 
"No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom 
of speech . . . ." 
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916, 935 (Utah 1993). Utah Constitution Article III demands that 
"[p]erfect toleration of religious sentiment is guaranteed." 
Based on this strong language, Society of Separationists v. 
Whitehead, concluded that the Utah Constitution mandated 
government neutrality toward religious practices. Id. at 936. 
Thus, the Utah Constitution provides plaintiff Snyder more 
protection than the United States Constitution. The court below 
agreed. Memorandum Decision, 3 (R. 476) . 
Nevertheless, the lower court determined incorrectly that 
Snyder's supplication was not a valid "religious belief' or a 
valid prayer. Memorandum Decision, 2 & 3 (R. 475-476); 
Memorandum Decision, 9 (R. 482) ("Mr. Snyder's statement is not a 
prayer"). The lower court found that Snyder's statement was non-
religious. The court below thus also incorrectly determined that 
Snyder did not have a valid free exercise claim. See Memorandum 
Decision, 4 (R. 477) ("To be valid, a free exercise claim must 
involve a ^religious belief.'"). 
Society of Separationists defined a prayer as "an address of 
entreaty, supplication, praise or thanksgiving directed to some 
sacred or divine spirit, being or object." Id. at 931-32 
(quoting Karen B. v. Trenn, 653 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 1981), 
aff'd 455 U.S. 913 (1982)). In Utah, an address which calls upon 
a supreme entity is prayer and is religious exercise even though 
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it may appear to be non-religious or have a secular purpose: 
"That [a prayer] may contemplate some wholly secular objective 
cannot alter the inherently religious character of the exercise." 
Id. 
The best and only reliable indication of Snyder's 
earnestness are his own sworn statements that he is indeed 
sincere. Under oath, Snyder stated: 
[My] personal and strongly held religious belief is that 
prayers are a private matter between an individual and his 
or her God. [My] religious upbringing and beliefs lead [me] 
to believe that Jesus Christ specifically spoke out against 
public prayers, including prayers before government 
meetings. 
Snyder Aff., 1 26 (R. 58-59). In making this assertion, Snyder 
relies on Matthew 6:5-6 from the New Testament and 3 Nephi 13:5-6 
from the Book of Mormon. Furthermore, Snyder believes 
[u]sing God's name or the name of Christ in a public prayer 
(directly contrary to God's clear teaching) is blasphemous, 
irreverent, and impious misuse of those names. 
Plaintiff's Statement of Facts, 1 33 (R. 88). 
In Mosier v. Mavnard, 937 F.2d 1521 (10th Cir. 1991), the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that personal 
statements, rather than external evidence, are the primary 
indicia of sincere beliefs. Id. In Mosier, an inmate claimed a 
religious exemption to the prison grooming code based upon his 
adherence to the Native American Religion. Id. at 1523. 
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The Appellate Court overturned the District Court's 
determination that the inmate's religious beliefs were insincere. 
Id. at 1524. Relying on a prison chaplain's testimony, the 
District Court incorrectly determined that there was not enough 
"external evidence" that the inmate "actually practiced his 
beliefs . . . ." Id., at . As a result, the District Court 
incorrectly ruled that the inmate was not entitled to a religious 
exemption based on external evidence. 
The prison's reliance on external evidence to show sincerity 
was misplaced. The Appellate Court questioned if the prison's 
policy sufficiently "accommodates [the] personal nature of belief 
and the primacy of personal statements and conduct when one seeks 
an exemption." Id. at 1527. The Appellate Court opined: 
. . . [the] prison's policy of denying the sincerity of a 
prisoner's religious beliefs unless he submits reputable 
non-family references vouching for sincerity represents a 
very limited approach to this question of fact. The policy 
prefers one type of corroborative evidence to the exclusion 
of all other types, both direct and indirect. 
Id.13 
13
 Importantly, because of its prison setting, Mosier 
requires that a lower standard of scrutiny be applied to the 
prison's policy than is applicable to the City's misconduct 
herein. Id. at 1525, citing O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 
U.S. 342, 349 (1987) ("What might be viewed as an unreasonable 
infringement of a fundamental constitutional right were it to 
occur outside of prison may be valid in prison as long as the 
infringement is reasonable related to legitimate penological 
objective . . . " ) . Thus, particularly telling is that the Court 
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The "scrutiny of the validity of particular beliefs largely 
is beyond . . . judicial function because 'religious beliefs need 
not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to 
others in order to merit First Amendment protection.'" Mosier, 
937 F.2d at 1526 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., Indiana Empl. 
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)).14 
In the case at bar, the court below erred in dismissing the 
sincerity of Snyder's belief. Snyder's sincerity and the 
religious nature of Snyder's beliefs are evident. He cites the 
religious basis for his opposition to public prayer. Snyder 
strongly believes not that it is merely unwise or politically 
rejected the prison's undue reliance on external evidence and 
insufficient attention to Hosier's personal statements, even 
under this reduced standard. 
14
 This Court recently addressed the constitutional 
aversion of the judiciary to examine religious practices in 
Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2001 Utah 
Lexis 43, 2001 UT 25, 416 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, P.2d (Utah 
2001): 
. . . it is well settled that civil tort claims against 
clerics that require the courts to review and interpret 
church law, policies, or practices in the determination 
of the claims are barred by the First Amendment under 
the entanglement doctrine, [citations omitted]. For, as 
the Supreme Court stated in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas 
Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 97 L. Ed. 120, 73 S. Ct. 143 
(1952), churches must have "power to decide for 
themselves, free from state interference, matters of 
church government as well as those of faith and 
doctrine." [citation omitted]. 
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manipulative to open public meetings with prayer, but that it is 
blasphemy. His belief is based on his religious upbringing and 
his understanding of commandments of Jesus Christ. His 
convictions are sincerely-held religious beliefs, protected under 
Utah's Constitution. 
Furthermore, Snyder's motivation for giving his Opening 
Prayer—to share with the City Council his aversion to public 
prayer as dictated by his religious views—is not any more 
indicative of the sincerity of his beliefs than the City's 
assessment of Snyder's state of mind. An individual's 
motivations are not indicative of sincerity. Snyder can 
consistently hold beliefs—for example that God might be female, 
that public prayer is hypocritical and that a wall should be 
erected between church and state—and simultaneously wish to 
present these beliefs at the Opening Ceremonies. Indeed, the 
sincerity of Snyder's beliefs prompted his desire to share these 
beliefs for the reasons the City finds so disturbing. Snyder 
wanted to explain the impropriety of the City's public prayer 
policy to the City's government. There is no better forum to 
suggest the religiously based impropriety of government sponsored 
prayer than during the portion of the opening ceremony designed 
for sharing religious ideas. 
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The court below should have accepted as true Snyder's 
sincerity. Snyder's Opening Prayer is a prayer and a religious 
exercise. The City did not remain neutral as to Snyder's 
religious exercise. Thus, the court below erred in failing to 
find that under Society of Separationists, Murray City violated 
Snyder's Art. I, § 4 right to perfect religious toleration. 
III. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CLAIM: BY REFUSING TO ALLOW SNYDER TO 
PRAY BEFORE THE MURRAY CITY COUNCIL, THE CITY VIOLATED 
ARTICLE I, § 4 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The lower court's determination of Snyder's establishment 
clause claim was likewise linked to whether Snyder's prayer was 
indeed a "prayer". See Memorandum Decision, 7-8 (R. 480-481) 
("Whether or not the Utah Supreme Court in Society of 
Separationists envisioned that governmental neutrality would 
encompass a Sprayer' such as Snyder's Sprayer' is unclear.")15. 
Again, the lower court determined that Snyder's statement was not 
a prayer. Memorandum Decision, 9 (R. 482). The lower court 
appears to suggest that because Snyder was afforded "the 
opportunity to speak during the later portion of the meeting" 
that the mandate of neutrality was meet. Memorandum Decision, 9. 
15
 This rhetorical question is answered in Society of 
Separationists, 870 P.2d at 938, by holding that even Atheists 
can offer prayers before government meetings. One would assume 
that an atheist prayer would be comparable to Snyder's Opening 
Prayer. 
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The public comment period is not set aside for prayer and 
does not have the prestige or influence enjoyed by the Opening 
Ceremonies. The City cannot justify its discrimination against 
Snyder's religious message by suggesting that he could have 
spoken at another time. The lower court erred in so suggesting. 
Relegating Snyder to the public comment period ("to the back of 
the bus") because the City finds Snyder's prayer offensive is as 
unconstitutional as entirely banning his prayer from the meeting. 
The fact remains that the City does not have a policy 
regarding opening prayers that it communicated or applied to any 
individual other than Snyder. Not until Snyder sought an 
opportunity to recite his prayer during the Opening Ceremony, did 
the City create and apply certain selective standards to Snyder 
and his prayer. 
Art. I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution does not permit public 
expenditures and the use of public property to "directly" benefit 
religious exercise. Society of Separationists v. Whitehead, 870 
P.2d 916, 936-37 (Utah 1993). Thus, the City may encourage 
public prayer at its Council meetings only when "the state is 
neutral" and thus "indirectly" benefitting religious exercise. 
To be neutral, government benefits "must be provided on a 
nondiscriminatory basis" and "must be equally accessible to all." 
Id. at 938. Thus, "if a city permits groups to use city-owned 
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facilities, that use must be permitted without regard to the 
belief system of the user." Id. (emphasis added). In addition, 
"the government must implement a system that awards the benefit 
so that each group, religious or secular, has a realistically 
equal opportunity for the use of the public resource." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
In Society of Separationists, the district court granted 
summary judgment ruling that the Salt Lake City Council violated 
Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution which provides, in 
pertinent part, "No public money or property shall be 
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or 
instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical 
establishment." 
The district court in Society of Separationists held that 
the City Council had impermissibly expended public money and had 
used public property to support religious exercise when it 
encouraged and permitted prayer during the City Council meetings' 
opening ceremony. The district court permanently enjoined 
further expenditures for such purposes and from allowing prayer 
before its meetings. 
This Court reversed the district court and concluded that 
the City Council's practice did not offend Article I, § 4. In so 
ruling, however, this Court discussed and analyzed in great 
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detail Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution. As noted, that 
interpretation of Article I, § 4 and its application control the 
action at bar. 
In Society of Separationists, this Court held that Article 
I, § 4 mandates only "governmental neutrality." This Court found 
Article I, § 4 commands "neutrality in the use of public money or 
property" in the support of religious exercises. 
This Court read the Utah Constitution to allow indirect aid 
to religion, such as prayers before government meetings, provided 
the state remains neutral. 
When the state is neutral, any benefit flowing to religious 
worship, exercise, or instruction can be fairly 
characterized as indirect because the benefit flows to all 
those who are beneficiaries of the use of government money 
or property, which may include, but is not limited to, those 
engaged in religious worship, exercise, or instruction. We 
therefore read this neutrality requirement into the "no 
public money or property" language of article I, § 4. 
Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 937-938. 
This Court then described the elements necessary for 
neutrality: 
First, the money or property must be provided on a 
nondiscriminatory basis. Some examples may be of 
assistance. If a city permits groups to use city-owned 
facilities, that use must be permitted without regard to the 
belief system of the user. Lutherans or Latter-day Saints 
who wish to use the facilities must have access on exactly 
the same terms as the Loyal Order of Moose, the American 
Atheist Society, or the Libertarian Party. . . . 
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Second, the public money or property must be equally 
accessible to all. . . . [T]he terms of access must be such 
that all users have a realistically equal opportunity to 
receive the benefit based on criteria that are unrelated to 
their belief systems. In other words, the government must 
implement a system that awards the benefit so that each 
group, religious or secular, has a realistically equal 
opportunity for the use of the public resource. For if 
government allows all groups to apply for the benefit but 
then discriminates in the selection process, it would be 
preferring one group over the other in violation of the 
constitutional principle of neutrality. 
at 938 (footnote omitted). 
This Court then addressed the Salt Lake City Council's 
cy, and determined that the City's practice complied with the 
State Constitution. This Court stated: 
In reaching this conclusion, we follow the two-step analysis 
of constitutional neutrality articulated above. First, we 
conclude that the expenditures made in connection with the 
arrangement for and provision of facilities for opening 
remarks were provided on a nondiscriminatory basis. The 
expenditures were not for the religious exercise itself, but 
for the meeting and that portion of the agenda that consists 
of generic opening thoughts, some of which may include 
prayers. Furthermore, the Separationists have not shown 
that the City Council favored particular religions or 
religion in general in scheduling participants. To the 
contrary, the record indicates that the City Council made 
efforts to assure that a broad cross-section of the 
community was represented. We conclude that any use of 
public money or property for facilitating the giving of 
opening remarks was made on a nondiscriminatory basis 
without regard to the belief systems of the speakers. 
Second, the Separationists have not shown that the City 
Council's policy denied any group or individual a 
realistically equal opportunity to participate in favor of 
particular religious groups or speakers or of religious 
speakers in general. 
at 938-939. 
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Thus, under the Utah Constitution government should not 
prefer religion over non-religion. Furthermore, government must 
maintain neutrality between those whose consciences are persuaded 
by religion and those whose consciences are not. 
Government is not to prefer religion to nonreligion, but 
neither should it be hostile to religion. Religious exercise is 
to be unfettered and freedom of conscience is to be supreme. 
. . . [T]he drafters of the Utah Constitution . . . wisely 
concluded that it was best to maintain neutrality among 
various religious groups as well as between those whose 
consciences were persuaded by religion and those whose 
consciences were not. 
Id. at 946 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
The City violated Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution 
interpreted by Society of Separationists by the denial of 
Snyder's request. The City flunks both prongs of the Society of 
Separationists neutrality test. They provided a forum on public 
property and as part of a public ceremony. However, they denied 
Snyder use of it based on the contents of his prayer. 
The City's bias against Snyder's religious message violates 
the "neutrality principle" of Art. I, § 4. Id^ at 937-938. The 
City has provided a state benefit—the opportunity to speak during 
its Opening Ceremonies—to only some religious practitioners. 
Those, like Snyder, who express non-traditional religious tenets, 
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are prohibited from participating in religious offerings before 
the City Council. 
As noted, the City's argument that it could refuse to allow 
Snyder to participate in the Opening Ceremonies because Snyder's 
message was "political" also fails. Under Art. I, § 4, the City 
cannot discriminate against Snyder because it finds his religious 
message is secular.16 Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 
938. The City implies that Society of Separationists requires 
such messages to be "generic." That decision does not authorize 
governments to dictate contents of prayers. Doing so violates 
Utah's Establishment Clause. 
The City does not have any policy regarding opening prayers 
that it communicated or applied to any individual or group save 
Snyder. Not until Snyder sought an opportunity to recite his 
prayer during the Opening Ceremony of the City Council meeting, 
did the City create and then apply new and selective standards to 
Snyder and his prayer. 
The City's banning of Snyder's prayer impermissibly 
establishes religion in violation of Article I, § 4 of the Utah 
Constitution. The City determines which religious beliefs are 
16
 This Court ruled that even atheists are allowed to offer 
"prayers" before City Council Meetings. Society of 
Separationists, 870 P.2d at 938. 
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appropriate for public recitation. Under the City's criteria, 
applicants whose religious beliefs, such as Snyder's, that the 
City deems to "mock" Council practices, are disfavored. 
Applicants whose beliefs and words the City find more palatable, 
are allowed to offer prayers. The City makes no attempt to be 
neutral. The City claims it has no obligation to be neutral in 
determining who can pray before a City Council meeting.17 
The City's process in considering a prayer means a minute 
examination of the contents of a proposed prayer based upon an 
unwritten criteria. Such an examination violates the neutrality 
requirement of Society of Separationists. Under Society of 
Separationists, the City should not examine or sit in judgment of 
a proposed prayer. Therefore, the City impermissibly 
"establishes" a religion in violation of Article I, § 4 as 
interpreted in Society of Separationists. 
17
 Defendants' position is that Snyder does not have a 
constitutional right to participate in the invocation portion of 
the City Council meeting. Hall Depo., 70:1-6 (R. 157). 
According to Hall, Society of Separationists does not hold that 
everyone in the community must be given an equal and meaningful 
opportunity to use a created public forum -- such as the time to 
give an invocation before a City Council meeting. Hall Depo., 
129:23 thru 130:10 (R. 170-171); 130:22-25 (R. 171); 132:7-19 (R. 
171) . 
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IV. DUE PROCESS: THE CITY'S SUMMARY DENIAL OF SNYDER'S REQUEST 
TO PRESENT HIS PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC FORUM ESTABLISHED BY THE 
CITY VIOLATES ARTICLE I, § 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The court below failed to give a thorough examination of 
Snyder's due process claim, because of its dismissal of Snyder's 
free exercise and establishment claims. See Memorandum Decision, 
9 (R. 482) . 
The City created a protected interest when it set aside the 
Opening Ceremonies as a public forum for expression. The Utah 
Constitution guarantees, once the City created this forum, that 
Snyder must have equal access for the expression of his religious 
view. In particular, under Art I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution, 
government benefits, such as the use of the City's property 
during the Opening Ceremonies, "must be provided on a 
nondiscriminatory basis" and "must be equally accessible to all." 
Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 938. Thus, "if a city 
permits groups to use city-owned facilities, that use must be 
permitted without regard to the belief system of the user." Id., 
(emphasis added). Therefore, under a procedural due process 
analysis, the City deprived Snyder of interests guaranteed by 
specific constitutional provisions. The City deprived Snyder of 
access to a public forum—a forum to which he was constitutionally 
guaranteed equal access. As it deprived Snyder of that protected 
interest, it gave him no hearing nor did the City have pre-
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established criteria to apply. For these reasons, the City 
violated Snyder's due process rights. 
The Utah Constitution requires government neutrality between 
religious practices and non-religious practices. It is 
constitutionally necessary that the City, upon encouraging 
individuals to participate in its Opening Ceremonies, not deny 
individuals access to this forum because it finds their message 
to be essentially secular.18 To do so violates the principle of 
government neutrality between religion and non-religion. The 
City violated Snyder's rights to due process under Article I, § 7 
of the Utah Constitution. The City created a public forum for 
the expression of religious and other ideas. However, they have 
no written criteria for deciding who may use that forum. "[T]he 
government must implement a system that awards the benefit so 
that each group, religious or secular, has a realistically equal 
opportunity for the use of the public resource." Society of 
Separationists, 870 P.2d at 938. The City established no hearing 
or appeal process to be used in making the determination or in 
appealing the decision. 
18
 Sometimes the City contends that the opening invocation 
need not be religious in nature, but simply contain uplifting 
thoughts. 
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The language of Society of Separationists is instructive as 
to what the City is required to do. That decision mandates that 
a system be established to guarantee neutral access to the forum. 
"[T]he government must implement a system that awards the benefit 
so that each group, religious or secular, has a realistically 
equal opportunity for the use of the public resource." Society 
of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 938, (emphasis added). The City 
has not implemented such a system; instead, access to the forum, 
the government benefit, is controlled by the unfettered 
subjective whim and fancy of the City Attorney. 
Snyder has a liberty interest in the free exercise of his 
religious beliefs within the public forum created by the City. 
The right to practice one's chosen religion uis the very core of 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Colombrito v. Kelly, 7 64 
F.2d 122, 131 (2nd Cir. 1985). Under Society of Separationists 
v. Whitehead, access to the government created forum (formal 
prayer time on a city council agenda) is a state created liberty 
interest. 
The essential requirements of due process are notice and an 
opportunity to respond. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 
470 U.S. 543, 546 (1985). "The opportunity to present reasons, 
either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be 
taken is a fundamental due process requirement." Id. The City 
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has failed to supply Snyder with even basic protection. In 
determining how much process is due, three factors are to be 
considered: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the 
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, 
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail. 
Matthews v. Eldridqe, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
In the case at bar, the private interest is Snyder's right 
to free expression and exercise of his religious beliefs-
fundamental constitutional guarantees. The risk of erroneous 
deprivation through the procedures used is great and apparent. 
Although not theologians or religious experts, the City 
determined, without giving Snyder an opportunity to respond, that 
Snyder's prayer is not a prayer and not a valid demonstration of 
religious belief. Simple and easy due process protections-
written criteria, notice, an opportunity to respond, an impartial 
arbiter, findings, notice of the right to appeal, an appellate 
review—may have prevented the harm to Snyder. 
The City's summary refusal to allow Snyder access to the 
public forum created by the City for the expression of religious 
speech, deprived Snyder of protected interests. The City did so 
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without any criteria or hearing, thus it violated Snyder's due 
process rights. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The decision of the court below is in error and should be 
reversed. The conduct of Murray City and City Attorney Hall 
violated the free speech, free exercise, establishment and due 
process provisions of the Utah Constitutions. Having created and 
opened a forum for religious expression, the City and Hall can 
not censor ideas based upon content. Snyder must be allowed to 
present his prayer at the important and reverent time set aside 
by the City for prayers before its council meetings. Snyder must 
be treated fairly and equitably in the same manner as all others 
offering prayers. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of AUGUST 2001. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT 
by u 
BRIAN MJ BARNARD 
JAMES L.\ HARRIS, Jd. 
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ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
These issues implicate important constitutional rights and 
will affect the protections afforded all Utahans. Furthermore, 
this case invokes a previous Utah Supreme Court decision, Society 
of Separationists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993). 
Appellant believes that oral argument will give the parties a 
beneficial opportunity to explain their respective positions and 
to answer questions from the Court. 
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ATTACHMENT A 
Compla in t , d a t e d August 2, 1999 (R. 1 ) . 
BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 0215 
JAMES L. HARRIS, Jr. USB # 8204 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Cooperating Attorneys for 
UTAH CIVIL RIGHTS & 
LIBERTIES FOUNDATION, INC. 
214 East 500 South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
Telephone: (801) 328-9531 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
TOM SNYDER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, 
a municipal corporation and 
H. CRAIG HALL, City Attorney 
for Murray City Corporation, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff, TOM SNYDER by and through counsel Brian M. 
Barnard and James L. Harris, Jr. of the Utah Legal Clinic, as 
cooperating attorneys for Utah Civil Rights and Liberties 
Foundation, Inc. in this COMPLAINT as claims and causes of action 
against the defendants states and alleges as follows: 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 
99-09 0 7fO£ 
. 7Z (Hon  [_(,\&x, 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
1. This is a civil action for monetary damages, declaratory 
relief and prospective injunctive relief to redress and prevent 
violation of civil rights protected by the constitution of the 
State of Utah. Plaintiff seeks monetary compensation for harm 
suffered as a result of unconstitutional conduct by the defendant 
government entity and actor. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief 
as to the unconstitutionality of defendants1 conduct. Plaintiff 
seeks injunctive relief prohibiting the government defendant from 
similar conduct in the future. 
2. This action is timely commenced under the provisions of 
Ut. Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1953 as amended). A similar action 
seeking the same relief was timely filed in 1994 in the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah, Snyder v. Murray 
City Corporation & Hall, Civil No. 2:94-CV-667 and those state 
claims were dismissed not upon the merits on April 13, 1999. 
Snvder v. Murray City Corp., 902 F. Supp. 1444 (D. Utah 1995); 
Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 902 F. Supp. 1455 (D. Utah 1995), 
aff'd in part & rev'd in part, Snyder v. Murray City Corp. 124 
F.3d 1349 (10th Cir. 1997); Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 
1227 (on rehearing en banc 10th Cir., 10/27/1998), cert, den'd. 
3. The basis for this action is Society of Separationists, 
Inc. v. Whitehead, et al, 870 P.2d 916, (Utah 1993) which 
2 
interpreted and applied the applicable provisions of the Utah 
Constitution holding that everyone, including atheists, has the 
constitutional right to offer opening remarks before city council 
meetings. 
JURISDICTION 
4. Jurisdiction in this court is based on Ut. Code Ann. § 
78-3-4 (1953 as amended). Declaratory relief is authorized by 
Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 et seq. (1953 as amended) and Rule 57 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Injunctive relief is author-
ized by Ut. Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1953 as amended) and Rule 65A of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
VENUE 
5. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Ut. Code Ann. 
§ 78-13-2(2) (1953 as amended). All of the conduct complained of 
occurred or will occur in Salt Lake County, Utah. The named 
individual parties to this action reside in Salt Lake County, 
Utah. Murray City Corporation has its place of business in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. 
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PARTIES 
6. The plaintiff TOM SNYDER is an adult citizen and a 
resident of the State of Utah and Salt Lake County, Utah. 
7. At pertinent times, H. CRAIG HALL was the City Attorney 
for the defendant MURRAY CITY CORPORATION. He was an employee of 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION. He had the administrative power to 
determine who would give prayers before meetings of the Murray 
City Council. He had the administrative power to determine what 
will be recited in prayers given before meetings of the Murray 
City Council. H. CRAIG HALL is no longer City Attorney of MURRAY 
CITY CORPORATION. Plaintiff seeks only declaratory relief and 
monetary damages against this individual defendant. 
8. MURRAY CITY CORPORATION is a government entity created 
pursuant to Utah State statute and governs the geographic area 
known as Murray, Utah located in Salt Lake County, Utah. It is a 
subdivision of the State of Utah. MURRAY CITY CORPORATION was 
the employer of the individual defendant H. CRAIG HALL and is the 
employer of his successor. MURRAY CITY CORPORATION delegated to 
H. CRAIG HALL and his successor the administrative power to 
determine who will give prayers before meetings of the Murray 
City Council and the administrative power to determine what will 
be recited in prayers given before meetings of the Murray City 
Council. 
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FACTS 
9. On March 23, 1994 the plaintiff wrote a letter to Jewel 
Chandler, an agent of MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, requesting infor-
mation about the offering of prayers before meetings of the 
Murray City Council. A copy of that letter is attached, marked 
as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference. 
10. The plaintiff never received a response to his March 
23, 1994 (Exhibit "A") letter. 
11. On May 9, 1994 the plaintiff wrote a second letter to 
Jewel Chandler requesting information about offering a prayer 
before a meeting of the Murray City Council. A copy of that 
letter is attached, marked as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein 
by reference. 
12. The plaintiff received a response to his letters in a 
letter dated June 1, 1994 from H. Craig Hall, Murray City 
Attorney. A copy of that letter is attached hereto, marked 
Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by reference. 
13. MURRAY CITY CORPORATION for a long time has had a 
practice that all Murray City Council meetings will start with a 
prayer. Exhibit "C" attached. MURRAY CITY CORPORATION has no 
specifically adopted guidelines or policies regarding the nature 
and/or content of prayers to be offered at the beginning of 
meetings of the Murray City Council. Exhibit "C" attached. 
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14. An administrative decision as to who may offer a prayer 
before a Murray City Council meeting was left to the sole dis-
cretion of defendant H. CRAIG HALL. An administrative decision 
as to the content of a prayer that may be offered before a Murray 
City Council meeting was left to the sole discretion of defendant 
H. CRAIG HALL. 
15. H. CRAIG HALL had the power on behalf of MURRAY CITY 
CORPORATION to administratively determine if a proposed prayer to 
be offered before a Murray City Council meeting is indeed a 
prayer and whether it will be allowed to be presented. 
16. H. CRAIG HALL had the administrative power on behalf of 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION to determine if a proposed prayer to be 
offered before a Murray City Council meeting is not a prayer but 
rather an expression of "political views, [an] attack [on] city 
policies or practices or [the] mock[ing of] city practices or 
policies" which he would not allow to be presented before a 
Murray City Council meeting as a prayer. Exhibit "C" & Exhibit 
"F" attached. 
17. On June 9, 1994 the plaintiff wrote a third letter to 
Jewel Chandler specifically asking to be allowed to appear and 
present a prayer before a meeting of the Murray City Council. A 
copy of that letter is attached, marked as Exhibit "D" and 
incorporated herein by reference. 
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18. Along with his letter of June 9, 1994 to Jewel 
Chandler, the plaintiff enclosed a copy of the prayer that he 
asked to be allowed to present before a meeting of the Murray 
City Council. A copy of that proposed prayer is attached, marked 
as Exhibit "E" and incorporated herein by reference. 
19. The proposed prayer (Exhibit "F") contains and sets 
forth deeply held and sincere religious beliefs of the plaintiff 
and conveys a religious message with regard to public prayers 
sponsored and encouraged by government entities. 
20. In a letter dated June 30, 1994, the defendant H. CRAIG 
HALL informed the plaintiff that plaintiff's proposed prayer 
(Exhibit "E" attached) was "unacceptable" and that based upon the 
content of the proposed prayer, the plaintiff would not be 
invited to participate in the opening ceremonies of a Murray City 
Council meeting. A true and correct copy of that rejection 
letter is attached hereto, marked as Exhibit "F" and incorporated 
herein by reference. 
21. Murray City has no adopted written rules, regulations, 
policies or practices to govern what religious exercises or 
prayers may be offered by what entities, when or under what 
circumstances before a Murray City Council meeting. Murray City 
has no specifically adopted written guidelines or policies 
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regarding the nature and/or content of prayers that may be 
offered before meetings of the Murray City Council. 
22. An administrative decision as to who may say a prayer 
before the Murray City Council was and is left to the sole 
discretion of defendant Craig Hall or his successor. An 
administrative decision as to the content of religious exercise 
or prayer to be offered before a meeting of the Murray City 
Council is left to the sole discretion of defendant Hall or his 
successor. 
23. Defendant Hall had and his successor has the 
administrative power on behalf of Murray City to determine if a 
proposed prayer is appropriate and will be allowed to be recited 
before a Murray City Council meeting. 
24. Defendants have established no appeal process whereby a 
party can challenge or have reviewed a denial by the City or its 
agent of a request to give a prayer before a Murray City Council 
meeting. 
25. In his letter of June 30, 1994, defendant Hall informed 
the plaintiff that plaintiff's offer to give a prayer at a Murray 
City Council meeting was denied. Exhibit "F" attached. 
26. The denial by defendants of plaintiff's request to give 
a prayer at the Murray City Council meeting constitutes a 
substantial burden on the plaintiff's exercise of his religion. 
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No compelling state interest or justification exists for the 
defendants1 refusal to allow plaintiff to exercise his religion 
and say a prayer in the same manner and in the same place that 
defendants have allowed others to say prayers for many years. 
27. Plaintiff was offered no right to appeal the denial; 
plaintiff was not informed of any procedure whereby he could 
appeal the denial of his request. 
28. At all times pertinent to this action the defendants 
were acting under color of state law and with the power and 
authority granted to them by the laws of the state of Utah. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
State Free Exercise 
29. The refusal of the defendants to allow the plaintiff to 
say a prayer before the Murray City Council violates the free 
exercise provision of Art. I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution. 
30. The plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief that 
the defendants1 conduct is in violation of his right to the free 
exercise of his religious beliefs as protected by the Utah 
Constitution. 
31. The plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief that the 
defendant City cease its conduct in violation of his right to the 
9 
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free exercise of his religious beliefs as protected by the Utah 
Constitution. 
32. The plaintiff is entitled to monetary damages as 
against the defendants for violation of the Utah State 
Constitutional provision protecting free exercise of religion 
(Art. I, § 4) in the sum of at least one dollar ($1.00) but in an 
amount to be determined at trial. The right of a person to free 
exercise of religion without burden, limitation or restriction by 
governmental entities is precious and valuable beyond estimation. 
33. The conduct of the defendants in seeking to censor the 
ideas of the plaintiff is a direct and severe violation of the 
Utah Constitutional protection of free exercise of religion. The 
conduct of the defendants is so egregious as to warrant the 
imposition of punitive damages in the sum of at least one dollar 
($1.00) but in an amount to be determined at trial. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
State Establishment Clause 
34. The refusal of the defendants to allow the plaintiff to 
offer his prayer before the Murray City Council violates the 
establishment provision of Art. I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution. 
35. The refusal of the defendants to allow the plaintiff to 
offer his prayer before the Murray City Council has favored or 
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established other religions over those of plaintiff in violation 
of the establishment provision of Art. I, § 4 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
36. The refusal of the defendants to allow the plaintiff to 
offer his prayer before the Murray City Council has disfavored or 
acted against the religious ideals of plaintiff in violation of 
the establishment provision of Art. I, § 4 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
37. The plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief that 
the defendants1 conduct is in violation of the establishment 
provision of the Utah Constitution. 
38. The plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief that the 
defendant City cease its conduct in violation of the 
establishment provision of the Utah Constitution. 
39. The plaintiff is entitled to monetary damages as 
against the defendants for violation of the Utah State 
Constitutional provision against the establishment of religion 
(Art. I, § 4) in the sum of at least one dollar ($1.00) but in an 
amount to be determined at trial. The right of a person not to 
suffer as a result of government favoring certain religious 
ideals over those of other persons is precious and valuable 
beyond estimation. 
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40. The conduct of the defendants in seeking to establish 
and promote religious ideals of persons to the exclusion of the 
plaintiff is a direct and severe violation of the Utah 
Constitutional. The conduct of the defendants is so egregious as 
to warrant the imposition of punitive damages in the sum of at 
least one dollar ($1.00) but in an amount to be determined at 
trial. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
State Due Process 
41. The actions of the defendants as set forth above have 
established a limited public forum. Defendants have created a 
forum for the expression of religious beliefs and for the giving 
of prayers during and at meetings of the Murray City Council. 
42. Defendants have no criteria with which to decide who 
may use the state created public forum for the expression of 
religious beliefs or for the giving of a prayer. 
43. Defendants have no hearing, appeal, etc., process with 
which to decide who may use the state created public forum for 
the expression of religious beliefs or for the giving of a 
prayer. 
12 
44. The right of a person to have access to a government 
created forum is a liberty interest of which a person cannot be 
deprived without due process. 
45. The summary refusal of the defendants to allow the 
plaintiff to have access to the created public forum for the 
expression of his religious beliefs and the giving of a prayer 
violates the due process provision of the Utah Constitution. 
Art. I, § 7. 
46. The plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief that 
the defendants1 conduct in denying him access to a state created 
forum without due process is a violation of the Utah 
Constitution. 
47. The plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief that the 
defendant City cease its conduct in violation of the due process 
clause of the Utah Constitution. 
48. The plaintiff is entitled to monetary damages as 
against the defendants for violation of the Utah State 
Constitutional provision protecting liberty interests with due 
process (Art. I, § 7) in the sum of at least one dollar ($1.00) 
but in an amount to be determined at trial. The right of a 
person not to be deprived of a liberty interest by governmental 
action absent due process is precious and valuable beyond 
estimation. 
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49. The conduct of the defendants in depriving plaintiff of 
a liberty interest without due process is a direct and severe 
violation of the Utah Constitution. The conduct of the 
defendants is so egregious as to warrant the imposition of 
punitive damages in the sum of at least one dollar ($1.00) but in 
an amount to be determined at trial. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
State Free Speech 
50. The refusal of the defendants to allow the plaintiff to 
give a prayer before a meeting of the Murray City Council 
violated the plaintiff's right to free speech. 
51. The plaintiff is entitled to monetary damages as 
against the defendants for violation of the Utah State 
Constitutional provision protecting free speech (Art. I, § 15) in 
the sum of at least one dollar ($1.00) but in an amount to be 
determined at trial. The right of a person to free speech 
without burden, limitation or restriction by governmental 
entities is precious and valuable beyond estimation. 
52. The conduct of the defendants in seeking to censor the 
ideas of the plaintiff is a direct and severe violation of the 
Utah Constitutional protection of free speech. The conduct of 
the defendants is so egregious as to warrant the imposition of 
14 
punitive damages in the sum of at least one dollar ($1.00) but in 
an amount to be determined at trial. 
53. The plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief that 
the defendants1 conduct is in violation of the free speech 
provisions of the Utah Constitution. 
54. The plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief that the 
defendant City cease its conduct in violation of the free speech 
provisions of the Utah Constitution. 
DEMAND FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands the following relief: 
1. The plaintiff is entitled to damages as against the 
defendants for violation of his right to free speech, 
establishment clause, the free exercise of his religious beliefs 
and his due process rights as protected by the Utah Constitution 
in an amount to be determined at trial but in the sum of at least 
one dollar ($1.00) . 
2. The plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages as against 
the defendants for violation of his right to free speech, 
establishment clause, the free exercise of his religious beliefs 
and his due process rights as protected by the Utah Constitution 
in an amount to be determined at trial but in the sum of at least 
one dollar ($1.00) . 
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3. The plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief that the 
defendants1 conduct is in violation of free speech, the free 
exercise protection, the establishment protection and the due 
process protections of the Utah Constitution. 
4. The plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief that the 
defendant City cease its conduct in violation of the free speech, 
free exercise protection, establishment protection and the due 
process protections of the Utah Constitution. 
5. If and to the extent allowed by law, plaintiff seeks an 
award of attorney fees and court costs. 
6. For such other and further relief as the court deems 
just and proper. 
DATED this 2nd day of AUGUST, 1999. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing COMPLAINT to: 
ALAN LARSON 
RICHARD VAN WAGONER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
# 1100 Newhouse Building 
12 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
FRANK NAKAMURA 
Murray City Attorney 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION 
5025 South State Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
on the 2nd day of AUGUST, 1999, postage prepaid in the United 
States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
C:\1983CASE\SNYDER\STATE COMPLAINT 102i 
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EXHIBITS 
Exhibit "A" — Letter from Plaintiff to Jewel Chandler 
dated March 23, 1994 
Exhibit "B" — Letter from Plaintiff to Jewel Chandler 
dated May 9, 1994 
Exhibit "C" — Letter from Craig Hall to Plaintiff 
dated June 1, 1994 
Exhibit "D" — Letter from Plaintiff to Jewel Chandler 
dated June 9, 1994 
Exhibit "E" — Plaintiff's Proposed Opening Prayer 
Exhibit "F" — Letter from Craig Hall to Plaintiff 
dated June 30, 1994 
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March 2 3 , 1 9 9 4 
J e w e l Chandler 
C i t y C o u n c i l O f f i c e s 
M u r r a y C i t y 
5 0 2 3 S o u t h S t a t e S t r e e t 
M u r r a y , Utah 34107 
R e : Prayer B e f o r e C i t y C o u n c i l M e e t i n g s 
D e a r Ms* Chandler: 
I am i n t e r e s t e d i n p r e s e n t i n g a p r a y e r before t h e 
Murray C i t y Counci l a t o n e o f i t / s u p c o m i n g meet ings . 
I 'would a p p r e c i a t e i t i£ y o u c o u l d p r o v i d e me any 
w r i t t e n in format ion w i t h r e g a r d t o g u i d e l i n e s or 
r e s t r i c t i o n s ( i f any) w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of-
s u c h p r a y e r s . I s t h e r e a t i m e l i m i t ? I s t h e r e a s e l e c t i o n 
p r o c e s s that: one neads t o g o t h r o u g h ? I s t h e r e some 
c r i t e r i a t h a r e s t a b l i s h e s who may b e a b l e t o o f f e r a prayer? 
I looJc forward t o p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a n upcoming Ci ty 
C o u n c i l meet ing of t h e M u r r a y C i r y . 
S i n c e r e l y , 
TOM SNYDER 
P.O Box S79-71 
Murray , U t a h 84157 
i EXHIBIT A, 
May 9 , 1994 
J e w e l Chandler* 
C i t y Counci l Offices 
Murray C i t y 
5025 South" State Street 
Murray, Utah. 84107 
Dear Ms. Chandler: 
I wrote to you on March 2 3 , 1 9 9 4 . A copy of that 
l e t t e r i s enclosed. I have n o t heard from you in response 
t o my l e t t e r . 
Should I assume that t h e r e a r e no w r i t t e n guidelines or 
r e s t r i c t i o n s with regarda t o t l i e p r e s e n t a t i o n of prayers 
b e f o r e c i t y council meetings. 
As I indicated in my l e t t e r I am i n t e r e s t e d -in 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g in an upcoming c i t y c o u n c i l meeting by 
o f f e r i n g a prayer. 
May I please hear from you? 
S i n c e r e l y , 
TOM SNYDER 
P.O. Box 57971 
Murray, Utah 8 4157 
Enclosure 
PLAINTIFFS «*• 
EXHIBIT 
«>/ 
<gSPR" c , ^ 
MURRAY 
CITY 
CORPORATION 
H. Craig Hall 
City Attorney 
264-2640 
June L, 1994 
Mr, Tom Snvder 
P. 0. Box 57971 
Murray,- UT 84157 
Re: Request to Utter a Prayer 
Dear Mr. Snyder: 
Your r e q u e s t to p resen t a p r a y e r b e f o r e t h e Ci ty Council has 
been forwarded to my of f ice for r e v i e w . 
The Munic ipa l Council has n o t e s t a b l i s h e d formal p o l i c i e s 
r e g a r d i n g t h e na tu re and/or c o n t e n t of t h i s r e v e r e n c e po r t i on of 
t h e i r agenda . However, t he Counci l has e s t a b l i s h e d the po l i cy 
t h a t a l l c o u n c i l meetings w i l l s t a r t w i t h p r a y e r . 
The purpose of the "prayer11 i s t o a l l o w i n d i v i d u a l s t h a t 
o p p o r t u n i t y to express t hough t s , l e a v e b l e s s i n g s , e t c . I t i s not 
a t ime t o e x p r e s s p o l i t i c a l v iews , a t t a c k c i t y p o l i c i e s or p r a c -
t i c e s o r mock c i t y p r a c t i c e s or p o l i c i e s . 
Comments on present c i t y p r a c t i c e s o r p o l i c i e s may be made 
a t c i t y c o u n c i l meetings by one of two methods; e i t h e r by reques t -
i n g t o be p l a c e d on the agenda^, o r , t a k i n g up t o t h r e e minutes 
d u r i n g t h e " c i t i z e n comment" p o r t i o n of t h e ^ m e e t i n g . The l a t e r 
method r e q u i r e s no p r io r arrangements t o be made. 
S i n c e r e l y , 
. C ra ig K l l 
Murray C i t ^ v ^ t t o r n e y 
HCH:dg 
TOM SNYDER 
POST OFFICE BOX 57971 
MURRAY, UTAH 84157 
June 9, 1994 
Jewel Chandler 
AcTm i n is~trat ive Offices 
Murray Ci ty 
Murray Municipal Building 
5025 South State Street 
P.O. Box 57520 
Murray, Utah 34157-0520 
Re: Prayers before City Council Meetings 
Dear Ms, Chandler: 
X understand that Murray City and t h e City CoTmcil 
encourages the practice of having p raye r s offered 5y 
c i t i z e n s before City Council meet ings . 
I would liJce to appear and o f fe r a p rayer at the next 
a v a i l a b l e meeting. 
Enclosed is a copy of t h e p rayer t h a t I will give* 
P lease l e t me know immediately when you want me to give 
t h i s p r a y e r . 
ThanJc you. 
S ince re ly , 
DtUrrrrtr<t5yyDCP£y.PRY 
PUUJJTIFP^I 
EXHIBIT I 
OPENING PRAYER 
OUR MOTHER, WHO ART I N HEAVEN ( I F , INDEED THESE 
I S A HEAVEN AND I F TEERE I S A GOD THAT TAKES A WOMAN'S FORM) 
HALLOWED BE THY NAME, WE ASR FOR THY BLESSING FOR AND 
GUIDANCE OF THOSE TEAT WILL PARTICIPATE I N THIS MEETING AND 
FOR THOSE MORTALS TEAT GOVERN THE STATE OF UTAH; 
WE FERVENTLY ASK TEAT YOU GUIDE THE LEADERS OF THIS 
CITY, SALT LAKE COUNTY AND THE STATE OF UTAH SO TEAT THEY 
MAY SEE THE WISDOM OF SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE AND SO 
THAT THEY WILL NEVER AGAIN PERFORM DEMEANING RELIGIOUS 
CEREMONIES AS FART OF OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS; 
WE PRAY TEAT YOU PREVENT SELF-RIGHTEOUS POLITICIANS 
FROM MIS-USING TEE NAME OF GOD I N CONDUCTING GOVERNMENT 
MEETINGS; AND, THAT YOU LEAD THEM AWAY *FROM THE HYPOCRITICAL 
AND BLASPHEMOUS DECEPTION OF THE P U B L I C , ATTEMPTING TO MAKE 
THE PEOPLE BELIEVE TEAT BUREAUCRATS' DECISIONS AND ACTIONS 
HAVE THY STAMP OF APPROVAL I F PRAYERS ARE OFFERED AT TEE 
BEGINNING OF GOVERNMENT MEETINGS ; 
WE ASK TEAT YOU GRANT UTAH'S LEADERS AND POLITICIANS 
ENOUGH COURAGE AND DISCERNMENT TO UNDERSTAND TEAT RELIGION 
I S A PRIVATE MATTER BETWEEN EVERY INDIVIDUAL AND HIS OR HER 
DEITY/ WE BESEECH THEE TO EDUCATE GOVERNMENT LEADER^ 
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS SHOULD NOT BE BROADCAST AND REVEALED FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF IMPRESSING OTHERS; WE PRAY THAT YOU STRIKE 
DOWN THOSE THAT MIS-USE YOUR NAME AND THOSE TEAT CHEAPEN THE 
I N S T I T U T I O N OF PRAYER BY USING I T FOR THEIR OWN SELFISH 
POLITICAL GAINS; 
WE ASK THAT THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH WILL SOME 
DAY LEARN THE WISDOM OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE; 
WE ASK TEAT YOU WILL TEACH-TEE PEOPLE OF UTAH TEAT 
GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT PARTICIPATE I N RELIGION; WZ PRAY THAT 
YOU SMITE THOSE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TEAT WOULD ATTEMPT TO 
CENSOR OR CONTROL PRAYERS MADE BY ANYONE TO YOU OR TO ANY 
OTHER OF OUR GODS; 
WE ASK TEAT YOU DELIVER US FROM TEE EVXL OF rORCED 
RELZGTOUS WORSHIP NOW SOUGHT TO BE IMPOSED UPON TEE PEOPLE 
OF TEE STATE OF UTAH BY TEE ACTIONS OF MIS-GUIDED, WEAK AND 
STUPID POLITICIANS, WHO ABUSE POWER TN*TEEIR OWN SZLF-
RIGHTEOUSNESS ; 
ALL OF THIS WE ASK I N THY NAME AND LN TEE NAME OF THY 
SON ( I F I N FACT YOU HAD A SON THAT V I S I T E D EARTH) FOR TEE 
ETERNAL BETTERMENT OF ALL OF US WHO POPULATE THE GREAT STATE 
OF UTAH. 
AMEN-
C:Ueasx\SNrDOPSf-?ar 
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>***Y O j y 
MURRAY *£%? 
CITY 
CORPORAnON 
2E5A.^U3 
tTuae 3 0 , 1994 
Mr. tlTcm Snydax' 
P . Q. 3 c x 57971 
mrrary , UT 34157 
2 e : Racneat to Utrar a Prayer 
Cear Mr* Snyder s 
Yonr proposed" prayer senr t o t h e MrrrTf.cigal Conncil has 2;eea 
for">rarded> t o my of f ice for response* 
The text: o f t i e proposed prayer i s n n a c c s p t a h l e - I t dees 
n e t follc-tr t h e guidelines s e t for th i n my l e t t e r dated J"UM I f 
1994* U n t i l your proposed prayer s a t i s f i e s tbe<se guidelines, an 
i z r r i n a t i c n t o part ic ipate in our opening c e r m o a i a s wi l l set be 
A l l correspondence regarding* t h i s m a t t e r shorxld be directed 
t o rry o f f i c e - I f j cu bare any q u e s t i o n s p l e a s e , contact ne d i -
r e c t l y . mZ wcnld appreciate a phone nnsher t h a t I may d i s c o s 
t h i s m a t t s r w i t h yon during the day* 
S i n c e r e l y , 
EC3:dg 
2:c: Mayor Lynn ?<. Pett 
Hxzrrray C i t y Hnnicipal Conner 1 
Murr^xr City M u r s c p a i Sytldirg « 5K2 Scutft State Sf rwi * P . O . 3 « 57222 * Murnty. Utifl 34T37-C22SX 
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ATTACHMENT B 
Letter from H. Craig Hall to Tom Snyder, 
June 1, 1994 (R. 128) . 
*RAY 
MURRAY 
CITY 
CORPORATION 
H. Craig Hall 
City Attorney 
264-2640 
June L* 19 9 4 
Mr, Tom Snyder 
P. 0. Box 57971 
Murray, UT 84157 
Re: Request to Utter a Prayer 
Dear Mr. Snyder: 
Your request to present a prayer before the City Council has 
been forwarded to my office for review. 
The Municipal Council has not e s t ab l i shed formal po l ic ies 
regarding the nature and/or content of t h i s reverence portion of 
t h e i r agenda. However, the Council has e s t ab l i shed the policy 
t h a t a l l council meetings will s t a r t with prayer . 
The purpose of the "prayer" i s to allow indiv iduals tha t 
opportunity to express thoughts, leave b l e s s i n g s , e t c . I t i s not 
a time to- express p o l i t i c a l views, a t t ack c i t y po l i c i e s or prac-
t i c e s or mock c i t y practices or p o l i c i e s . 
Comments on present ci ty p rac t i ces or p o l i c i e s may be made 
a t c i t y council meetings by one of two methods; e i t h e r by request-
ing to be placed on the agenda/ o r , t ak ing up to three minutes 
during the " c i t i z en comment" port ion of the meeting. The l a t e r 
method requ i res no prior arrangements to be made. 
Sincerely, 
^H. Crazg 
Murray Cit£y-C&ttorney 
HCH:dg 
Murray City Municipal Building . 5025 South State S(r*»»» -on Sn» *Tv>n J 
ATTACHMENT C 
Letter from Tom Snyder to Jewel Chandler, 
June 9, 2001 (R. 130). 
RECEIVED 
MURRAY CITY COUNCIL 
— r „ > • , -
TOM-SNYDER 
POST OFFICE BOX 57971 
MURRAY, UTAH 84157 
June 9, 1994 
Jewel Chandler 
Administrative Offices 
Murray City 
Murray Municipal Building 
5025 South State Street 
P.O. Box 57520 
M u r r a y , Utah 34157-0520 
R e : P r a y e r s be fo re C i t y C o u n c i l M e e t i n g s 
Dear Ms. Chand le r : 
I u n d e r s t a n d t h a t Murray C i t y and t h e C i t y Counc i l 
e n c o u r a g e s t h e p r a c t i c e of h a v i n g p r a y e r s o f f e r e d by 
c i t i z e n s b e f o r e C i t y C o u n c i l m e e t i n g s . 
I would l i k e t o a p p e a r and o f f e r a p r a y e r a t t h e n e x t 
a v a i l a b l e mee t i ng . 
E n c l o s e d i s a copy of t h e p r a y e r t h a t I w i l l g i v e . 
P l e a s e l e t me know, i m m e d i a t e l y when you want me t o g i v e 
t h i s p r a y e r . 
Thank you. 
S i n c e r e l y , 
TOM SNYDER 
D:\Icctcr\SNYDOPEN.PRY 
ATTACHMENT D 
Opening Prayer (R. 131-132) . 
OPENING PRAYER 
OUR MOTHER. WHO ART IN HEAVEN ( I F , INDEED THERE 
I S A HEAVEN AND IF THERE I S A GOD THAT TAKES A WOMAN'S FORM) 
HALLOWED BE THY NAME, WE ASK FOR THY BLESSING FOR AND 
GUIDANCE OF THOSE THAT WILL PARTICIPATE IN THIS MEETING AND 
FOR THOSE MORTALS THAT GOVERN THE STATE OF UTAH; 
WE FERVENTLY ASK THAT YOU GUIDE THE LEADERS OF THIS 
CITY, SALT LAKE COUNTY AND THE STATE OF UTAH SO THAT THEY 
MAY SEE THE WISDOM OF SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE AND SO 
THAT THEY WILL NEVER AGAIN PERFORM DEMEANING RELIGIOUS 
CEREMONIES AS PART OF OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS; 
WE PRAY THAT YOU PREVENT SELF-RIGHTEOUS POLITICIANS 
FROM MIS-USING THE NAME OF GOD IN CONDUCTING GOVERNMENT 
MEETINGS; AND, THAT YOU LEAD THEM AWAY FROM THE HYPOCRITICAL 
i 
AND BLASPHEMOUS DECEPTION OF THE PUBLIC, ATTEMPTING TO MAKE 
THE PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT BUREAUCRATS' DECISIONS AND ACTIONS 
HAVE THY STAMP OF APPROVAL I F PRAYERS ARE OFFERED AT THE 
BEGINNING OF GOVERNMENT MEETINGS; 
WE ASK THAT YOU GRANT UTAH'S LEADERS AND POLITICIANS 
ENOUGH COURAGE AND DISCERNMENT .TO UNDERSTAND THAT RELIGION 
I S A PRIVATE MATTER BETWEEN EVERY INDIVIDUAL AND HIS OR HER 
DEITY; WE BESEECH THEE TO EDUCATE GOVERNMENT LEADERS THAT 
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS SHOULD NOT BE BROADCAST AND REVEALED FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF IMPRESSING OTHERS; WE PRAY THAT YOU STRIKE 
DOWN THOSE THAT MIS-USE YOUR NAME AND THOSE THAT CHEAPEN THE 
INSTITUTION OF PRAYER BY USING IT FOR THEIR OWN SELFISH 
POLITICAL GAINS; 
WE ASK THAT THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH WILL SOME 
DAY LEARN THE WISDOM OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE; 
WE ASK THAT YOU WILL TEACH THE PEOPLE OF UTAH THAT 
GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN RELIGION; WE PRAY THAT 
YOU SMITE THOSE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS THAT WOULD ATTEMPT TO 
CENSOR OR CONTROL PRAYERS MADE BY ANYONE TO YOU OR TO ANY 
OTHER OF OUR GODS; 
WE ASK THAT YOU DELIVER US FROM THE EVIL OF FORCED 
RELIGIOUS WORSHIP NOW SOUGHT TO BE IMPOSED UPON THE PEOPLE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH BY THE ACTIONS OF MIS-GUIDED, WEAK AND 
STUPID POLITICIANS, WHO ABUSE POWER IN THEIR OWN SELF-
RIGHTEOUSNESS; 
ALL OF THIS WE ASK IN THY NAME AND IN THE NAME OF THY 
SON (IF IN FACT YOU HAD A SON THAT VISITED EARTH) FOR THE 
ETERNAL BETTERMENT OF ALL OF US WHO POPULATE THE GREAT STATE 
OF UTAH. 
AMEN. 
C.UetteriSNYDOPEN.PRY 
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ATTACHMENT E 
Letter from H. Craig Hall to Tom Snyder, 
June 30, 1994 (R. 134) . 
***£«*•> 
•SACT 
MURRAY 
cmr 
CORPORATION 
H_ Craig HaJ! 
QtyAnomoy 
June 3 0 , 1334 
Mr. Tom Snyder 
P. O. Bex 57971 
Marray, UT 841J57 
Re: Reqrxes-fc to Utter a Prayer 
Gear Mr. Snyder r 
Yoxsr proposed" prayer sent t o the Municipal Coxsncil has b**n 
forwarded t o my of f i ce for response-
T i e t e x t ot the proposed prayer i s unacceptable- I t does 
n e t f o l l o w tiie guidelines s e t forth i n sty l a t t e r dated Jfcae I , 
1394; U n t i l your proposed prayer s a t i s f i e s t h e s e gt^Ldelines, ^n 
i i r r i t a t i o n t o part ic ipate in our opening ceremonies w i l l not be 
forthcoming1« 
A l l correspondence regarding t h i s matter should be directed 
t o sxy o f f i c e - I f yon bare any ques t ions p l e a s e , contact ne d i -
r e c t l y . X wcnld appreciate a phone nrssber t h a t I may discuss 
t h i s mattar w i t h yon daring: the day* 
S incere ly
 k 
^ S w < , .£r3±* 
Murray Citfy a t torney 
HC3:dg-
arc: Hayor Z»ynzx P* Pett 
Murray C i t y Municipal Council 
\M 
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ATTACHMENT F 
Memorandum Decision, 
entered on February 9, 2001 (R. 474). 
ILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
9 2001 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TOM SNYDER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, a 
municipal corporation and 
H. CRAIG HALL, City Attorney 
for Murray City Corporation, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 990907806 
Plaintiff claims that Murray City's denial of his offer to 
pray before the City Council meeting interferes with his exercise 
of religion under the free exercise guaranteed by Article I, 
Section 4, of the Utah Constitution, He further argues that Murray 
City violated the establishment clause and that he has been 
deprived of the liberty interests without due process. He further 
claims a violation of his free speech right. The defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss the free speech claim under Article I, Section 
15, of the Utah Constitution is granted based on the five year 
statute of limitations. 
Article I, Section 4, provides that: 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The 
State shall make Vno laws respecting an establishment of 
iligion, or prohibiting^ the free exercise thereof; no re-
religious test sh%ll be required as qualification for any 
office of public'trustsor for any vote at any election; 
t EXHIBIT 
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nor shall any person be incompetent as a witness or juror 
on account of religious belief or the absence thereof. 
There shall be no union of Church and State nor shall any 
church dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall be 
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, 
exercise or instruction, or for the support of any 
ecclesiastical establishment. No property qualification 
shall be required of any person to vote, or hold office, 
except as provided in this Constitution. 
Plaintiff argues that the defendant did not remain neutral and 
therefore violated plaintiff's right to free exercise. The City 
argues that it does not have an affirmative duty to provide Snyder 
with a forum in which to exercise his religion. Furthermore, the 
City contends that it did offer Snyder the opportunity to speak 
during the public comment period of the meeting. Finally, the City 
claims that Snyder did not have a deeply held religious belief in 
the practice he seeks to exercise. 
Snyder admits that his purpose in volunteering to offer prayer 
before the Murray City Council meeting was to illustrate to the 
Murray City Council the error in their prayer policy and to get 
them to abandon said policy. To this end, the Snyder "prayer" is 
really a protest and since Snyder chose to style his political 
commentary as a "prayer," it makes a mockery of prayer for the 
purpose of embarrassing the listeners, it contains no sincere 
application to any form of deity, and as pointed out by the 
defendant in their briefs, it is critical of the policy of Murray 
SNYDER V. 
MURRAY CITY PAGE 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
City and criticizes politicians in general and any coincidental 
bumping together of church and state. 
The free exercise clause bars any law prohibiting the free 
exercise of religion. This is for the purpose of preventing 
government from outlawing or seriously burdening a person's pursuit 
of religion. The City relies primarily on the conclusions of the 
United States District Court and the United States Court of Appeals 
in determining that it did not violate Utahfs free exercise clause. 
In response, Snyder argues that reliance upon federal decisions is 
improper because the Utah Constitution provides individuals with 
greater protection than federal law. This is true, and in support 
thereof Snyder cites Society of Separationists v. Whitehead, 
claiming that the City did not remain neutral and therefore his 
free exercise rights were violated (870 P.2d 916 (1993)). 
While the Society of Separationists is instructive, the issues 
are distinguishable from the present case. First, Society of 
Separationists contains a direct challenge to Salt Lake City's 
policy allowing prayer at the beginning of City Council meetings. 
Snyder does not challenge the policy of allowing prayer, but 
challenges instead the accessibility of the opportunity to give a 
prayer to all individuals. Second, Society of Separationists 
focuses on that portion of Article I, Section 4, which provides 
that "no public money or property shall be appropriated for or 
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applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or for 
the support of any ecclesiastical establishment," 
To be valid, a free exercise claim must involve a "religious 
belief." Snyder provides this Court with an Affidavit stating that 
the convictions and beliefs expressed in his prayer are sincere and 
religious. He also provides an Affidavit from a philosophy 
professor at the University of Utah stating that his "statement" is 
a "prayer." The federal court in the Snyder case found that 
Snyder's speech was political and not religious. This Court 
differs with both Affidavits recognizing that Snyder's statement is 
clearly non-religious, while it may be sincere. 
The City argues that it did not have an affirmative duty to 
provide Snyder with a forum in which to exercise his "religion" and 
that it has a right to run a Council meeting subject to rules of 
order and stability, and that it is completely reasonable to 
require Snyder to speak during the public comment portion of the 
meeting. Murray City's policy and practice has been to have an 
opening ceremony with a purpose of promoting civility, lofty 
thoughts, attention to agenda items and to clear out the clutter of 
the day. Snyder's statement is contrary to said purpose. 
As argued by Snyder, the Utah Supreme Court in Society of 
separationists states that the Utah Constitution provides greater 
protection than federal law. Society of Separationists gives an 
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expansive definition of "religious worship, exercise or 
instruction," but Snyder's statement still falls without that 
definition. However, under Society of Separationists, whether or 
not the "prayer11 is inherently religious may not be dispositive 
because a non-religious statement should be given the same rights 
to expression as a religious statement. 
Snyder argues that the City violates the establishment clause 
by disallowing the presentation of Snyder's beliefs while allowing 
other religious beliefs and ideas to be presented. Snyder argues 
that the City improperly prefers religion over non-religion in 
violation of Article I, Section 4. Furthermore, Snyder claims the 
City did not have any policy or practice regarding who can perform 
an opening prayer, a claim which appears to be valid. 
The City argues that permitting Snyder's "prayer" would have 
violated the Society of Separationists. since under that case 
opening ceremonies cannot be used for proselytizing. In Society of 
Separationists the court stated that prayer is "a portable, yet 
inherently religious, exercise. It need not occur within a group 
of celebrants to take on religious character, although it may arise 
there. One person praying, silently or aloud, alone in a crowd, 
among nonbelievers or believers, is still participating in a 
religious exercise. We think to hold otherwise would demean prayer 
and those who practice it." Snyder's "prayer" fails to meet this 
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definition of religious exercise and to include it as a prayer or 
as an exercise of religion would demean those who do pray and who 
practice religion. 
Again, Society of Separationists is distinguishable from the 
instant case. As stated above, it contains a direct challenge to 
Salt Lake Cityfs policy allowing prayer at the beginning of City 
Council meetings, which is not a challenge that Snyder makes. He 
challenges accessibility. Society of Separationists focuses on 
that portion of Article I, Section 4, regarding the expenditure of 
public money in support of an ecclesiastical establishment and that 
appears to not be at issue in the instant case. In the Society of 
Separationists action the Salt Lake City Council's opening ceremony 
policy had been adopted, but was not formalized as an ordinance or 
resolution, however, the policy was formalized as a resolution soon 
thereafter. The Society of Sssparationists court specifically noted 
that it did not believe that the informal status of the policy at 
the time the lawsuit filed was "outcome determinative." The Murray 
City policy was less formal if anything than the City Council's 
policy, and it is uncertain whether Murray City intended to 
formalize that policy or not. 
Although the Utah Constitution provides greater protection 
than federal law, the federal court's interpretation is of 
interest. Judge Greene of the United States District Court 
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concluded that Snyder's prayer did not violate the federal 
establishment clause and was "properly excluded from the reverence 
portion of the meeting, however, because it disparages the faith 
and beliefs of others, and contains political commentary concerning 
the City's practices and it proselytizes and advances plaintiff's 
belief concerning church and state." Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 
902 F.Supp. 1444, 1452 (1995). The United States Court of Appeals 
held that the "establishment clause does not give any individual 
the right to establish his religion by guaranteeing an opportunity 
to pray during public meetings and certainly does not require 
Murray City to permit all comers to speak during the reverence 
portion of its City Council meetings." Snyder v. Murray City 
Corp.. 124 F.3d 1349, 1353 (1997). 
In order to avoid a religious clause challenge, it appears 
that Murray City must engage in an opening ceremony based upon the 
concept of government neutrality. Whether or not the Utah Supreme 
Court in Society of Separationists envisioned that governmental 
neutrality would encompass a "prayer" such as Snyder's "prayer" is 
unclear. Under its discussion of neutrality, Society of 
Separationists indicates that absolute neutrality may mean that the 
City cannot discriminate based on an individual's belief system. 
This notion of neutrality is applied by the court in the context of 
concluding that all groups who want to use City facilities must 
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have equal access. However, equal use of City facilities may not 
amount to an equal opportunity to provide disparaging remarks 
during the opening portion of the City Council meeting. The City 
emphasizes this point, claiming that Society of Separationists 
endorsed "generic" statements made at the opening ceremony and did 
not encourage proselytizing. Snyder, on the other hand, claims 
that if only generic statements are allowed, the concept of prayer 
becomes essentially void. This Court agrees with Mr. Snyder on 
this premise. 
Society of Separationists stands for the proposition that the 
concept of government neutrality also includes equal access to all. 
The Court specifically found that the Salt Lake City Council had 
not favored one religion or religion in general, and the Salt Lake 
City Council made efforts to assure a broad cross-section of the 
community was represented. These efforts were in compliance with 
the City Council's resolution which provides in part that the 
opening ceremony will (1) provide a moment during which Council 
members and the audience can reflect on the importance of the 
business before the Council; (2) recognize cultural diversity; and 
(3) foster sensitivity for and recognize the uniqueness of all 
segments of our community. At the time Snyder brought his suit no 
such formal policy existed in Murray City. 
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Snyder contends that the City created a protected interest 
when it scheduled the opening ceremony as a public forum for 
religious expression and that the City deprived Snyder of interests 
guaranteed by specific constitutional provisions. It is difficult 
to discern whether Snyder presents a procedural due process or a 
substantive due process claim, and any analysis of the due process 
right is dependent upon the free exercise and establishment clause 
claims discussed above, 
Mr. Snyder's statement is not a prayer. His statement was 
clearly non-religious. The statement further is proselytizing, in 
that its purpose is to encourage others to criticize Murray City's 
policy. Society of Separationists requires non-religious claims be 
given equal time with religious claims in ceremonies such as the 
ones in question. However, the nature of Snyder's statement was 
clearly not contemplated by the Murray City Council in establishing 
its policy, and Mr. Snyder was offered the opportunity to speak 
during the later portion of the meeting more appropriate for 
political statements. 
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Snyder's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. Murray City 
Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
Dated this c day of February, 2 001. 
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